**Ethanol 1AC**

**Plan**

**The United States Federal Government should lift all import restrictions on sugar cane ethanol produced in the Republic of Cuba and facilitate the growth of a Cuban sugar cane ethanol sector through foreign direct investment.**

**Contention One – Oil Dependence**

**Plan’s key to efficiently supplement corn ethanol – most effective method to reduce oil dependence – other alternatives don’t solve**

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Note that the USA produces about 11% and consumes about 25% of world demand. Recent increases are attributable largely to growing economies in China, India, and other developing countries. At the current rate of worldwide oil consumption, the above worldwide oil reserves equate to about 44 years of production. Of course, total proved reserves includes both developed and undeveloped reserves, and a substantial portion of the total proved reserves have yet to be developed and produced. Such development and production will require considerable expenditures. For economic reasons, therefore, we have tended generally to have somewhere in the range of 10-15 years of developed and producing reserves at any time. Of course, we cannot accurately determine the amount of reserves present until they are developed and produced, but these estimates are developed using reasonable methodologies. What must be understood is that this does not mean we have 10 or 15 or 44 years before the oil runs out. The “peak oil” question must be addressed when new discoveries start to run out, but that has not been the case yet. However, at some point **the question of how long we can continue to rely on oil must be faced.** Given that the 44 years of reserves identified above represent what has been found with technology to date, and that **finding new reserves is becoming technologically more difficult and substantially more expensive, it is not unreasonable to infer from the above that the era of relatively cheap oil will be over** within something approaching 50 years, and therefore **we need to be migrating away from oil in earnest** by that time. **The problem with migrating away from oil is that it has proved to be very difficult to find a reasonable alternative to oil.** Sandalow has identified ten key facts about oil, each with an important implication, as follows (Sandalow, 2008): One reason that **oil** is so hard to replace is that it **is a relatively efficient energy source**. Cleveland, Costanza, Hall, and Kaufmann compared the “energy profit ratio” of various renewable and nonrenewable energy sources (Cleveland, et al, 1984), and Howard T. Odum compared the “energy yield ratio” (Odum, 1976). Their findings were summarized by Richard Heinberg (Heinberg, 2006, pp 162-164). **Oil has yield rates in the range of 8** to 11 and natural gas in the range of 7 to 10, with coal even higher. **Among alternatives,** only **sugar cane ethanol** (**8.3** to 10.2, per Goettemoeller, 2007), 100-year growth rainforest (12.0 per Odum), hydroelectric (11.2 per Cleveland and 10.0 per Odum), solar photovoltaics (1.7 to 10.0, per Cleveland), geothermal from hot dry rock (1.9 to 13.0 per Cleveland and 13.0 per Odum), and tidal electric with a 25-foot tide range (15.0 per Odum). The **fossil fuels** (oil, natural gas, coal) as a group **produce significantly higher energy profit ratios or energy yield ratios than do most green alternatives. This differential is typically reflected in price; we depend so heavily on oil, and to a lesser extent on other fossil fuels, because they provide more energy cheaper than do the currently available alternatives. One barrier to alternative energy sources is that the cost of those alternatives is higher than the cost of oil. However, the cost of oil is also rising. As time passes, we are still making significant discoveries** (such as Brazil’s finds in the Campos, Santos, and Espirito Santo basins) **and as prices rise so will oil supplies, as some known reservoirs are economically viable to produce only at higher prices. But we appear to have found most of the “easy” oil, and what is discovered in the future can reasonably be expected to be more expensive to produce.** Green, Jones, and Leiby, in a 1995 report prepared for the Office of Transportation Technology of the United States Department of Energy, forecasted that “in the long run the net price of oil (price minus marginal extraction costs) will rise steadily at the rate of interest” (Green, et al, 1995, p. 5). Since that time, **oil prices have fluctuated wildly but the overall trend is clearly upward.** The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE/EIA) prepares an annual energy report and forecast with projections of future energy supply and demand, specifically projecting supply and demand components for 2020 and 2030. The 2007 and 2009 forecasts (DOE/EIA, 2007 and DOE/EIA, 2009) can be compared as follows (reference case, volumes in quadrillion Btu/year): The 2009 forecast differs from the 2007 forecast primarily in that it considers the impact of the decline in energy consumption during the latter half of 2008. Although both forecasts predict an increase in domestic oil and gas production as well as energy from other source, both forecasts leave the U.S. very much dependent on foreign oil as far into the future as 2030. President Barack **Obama has stated, "And for the sake of our economy, our security, and the future of our planet, I will set a clear goal as president: In 10 years, we will finally end our dependence on oil from the Middle East** (Obama, 8/28/2008).” **Unfortunately, it does not appear that the energy program outline by President Obama will accomplish that goal. Efforts to develop wind, solar, and improved insulation for buildings will have minimal impacts on oil usage.** Perhaps the signature element—the electric automobile—is now coming into use, with a goal of 1 million on the road by 2015 (Obama, 1/25/2011). Assuming that each electric vehicle saves 4 gallons of gasoline per day, achieving that goal would reduce current oil consumption by about 200,000 barrels per day, or less than 1 percent. It is entirely likely that on the current path, the US will import more oil in 2015 than today, thus continuing the trend of the last 40 years of becoming ever more dependent on foreign oil. To date, the US has fallen far short of its intended goal of reducing its dependency on foreign oil. In fact that **dependency has increased** rather than decreased. It is the opinion of the authors that this results from three flaws in the US approach:  There has been a focus on developing a perfect solution in a laboratory environment and then implementing it, rather than making use of what is available.  Particularly with respect to oil, the perfect alternative has not been found, nor at this point is there any strong suggestion of what it might be.  **Regulations have hampered many private sector efforts to develop solutions. As a result the US finds itself in a position where it must address two potentially negative factors:  The era of cheap energy is coming to an end.  We currently have no good substitute**s **for oil.** THE APPROACH TAKEN BY BRAZIL **Brazil**, which was even more dependent on foreign oil than was the U.S. in the 1970s, **is today virtually energy-independent**. Because of transportation considerations and difficulties refining heavy oil, Brazil does import some oil, primarily from Bolivia (although that is expected to change once production in the offshore Campos, Santos, and Espirito Santo basins is up to speed), but it exports sufficient oil to be a net exporter of energy. Brazil is now among the ten largest suppliers of oil to the USA. Clearly, the Brazilian economy in general, and its energy consumption in particular, is significantly smaller than in the USA, so some lessons are not strictly applicable. However, **Brazil clearly did some things better than the U.S., and there are some broad general principles that have significant applicability. Brazil’s well-known and massive effort to develop alternatives to gasoline** (**sugar cane ethanol**) and diesel fuel (soybean-based biodiesel) **has replaced approximately 50% of gasoline** and 44% of the country’s on-the-road motor fuel. It should be noted that criticism that Brazil has destroyed the Amazon basin to produce ethanol is unfounded. Sugar cane is produced in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goias, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, Parana, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, and Sergipe. The area with maximum potential for expansion lies in the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goias. All these areas lie outside the Amazon basin (Lachlau, Sergio Andre, in Schwind, 2007). Further, it is estimated that approximately 65% of the area now producing sugar cane was converted from pasture land before. Brazil does also produce a significant amount of biodiesel, primarily from soybeans, and a considerable amount of soybean production does take place in areas that have been cleared in the Amazon basin. What may be less well known is that Brazil’s approach also included significant amounts of increased domestic exploration for oil and gas (the source of the other 56% of motor fuel) and hydroelectric (35% of Brazil’s total energy needs). Today Petrobras is perhaps the world’s leading center of expertise in deep water drilling. This has resulted in significant new finds in the offshore Santos, Campos and Espirito Santo basins. While Brazil’s recoverable reserves of oil and gas are less than those of the U.S., they are growing rapidly, and continued development could transform Brazil into one of the largest oil producers in the world (DOE/EIA, Brazil country brief, 2011). This emphasis on a broad frontal attack on the problem from all sources was accompanied by a strong bias in favor of action, specifically action utilizing known technology rather than waiting for future technologies to prove themselves. The ethanol plants are themselves relatively primitive, particularly when compared to a U.S. oil refinery (Schwind, 2007). Brazil has refused to become slave to “perfect” or to allow “perfect” to become the worst enemy of “good enough.” This is quite a contrast to the U.S. effort, where there has been considerable research into a “perfect” solution, but comparatively little effort to get “good enough” solutions implemented. Brazil’s approach also included a heavy orientation toward the private sector and free markets. Realizing that as a government-owned entity, Petrobras would likely be too bureaucratic and not sufficiently nimble to respond as needed, the government sold a large stake in the company and passed management duties and privileges to the non-government shareholders. Brazil moved further toward a free-market approach by ending Petrobras’s exclusive concession to develop all domestic oil and gas, and invited foreign companies to come in and take down exploration and production concessions. The mechanisms whereby sugar growers determine whether to sell there produce for making into sugar or into ethanol, and similarly the mechanisms whereby motorists decide whether to burn gasoline or ethanol in their autos (which are set up to burn either) rely almost entirely upon free-market principles. The sugar cane grower compares the prices he can receive at the sugar mill and at the ethanol plant before deciding where to sell his crop. Because automobiles and trucks are configured to run on either gasoline/diesel or ethanol/bio-diesel, the motorist can check the price of each, adjust for performance differential, and make a rational economic decision which one she should put into her vehicle today. Using sugar cane ethanol as the “swing” product introduces some price elasticity to both sugar and oil. While the sugar market is depressed today, lower sugar prices mean that farmers will deliver more sugar cane to the ethanol plant, and **ethanol prices give** some **insulation against oil**—and resulting gasoline—**price shocks.** The lessons to be learned from the Brazilian experience may be summarized as follows: Table 8 United States Of America Brazil The U.S. has debated the question of “drill here, drill now” versus alternatives versus conservation. The emphasis has been on debate and discussion rather than action. Brazil pursued all available options vigorously and simultaneously. The Brazilian approach has been “drill here, drill now” plus alternatives plus conservation. There has been a strong bias toward action. The U.S. has focused upon developing the “perfect” solution in the laboratory and then bringing that solution to reality. Brazil utilized existing technology to the maximum extent possible, and phased in improved technologies as they make the transition from laboratory to real world usefulness. Brazil has vigorously avoided letting “perfect” get in the way of “good enough”. The U.S. government has maintained an adversarial stance toward the energy industry, and has sought to regulate its activities heavily. Brazil has pushed toward a more cooperative approach with the energy industry, and generally allowed the free market to work. APPLYING THE LESSONS FROM BRAZIL TO THE UNITED STATES These **lessons learned from Brazil can be applied to address the USA’s energy problems.** Conservation, alternatives, and increased production from conventional domestic sources must be accompanied by vigorous research and development effort. Rather than wait for perfect technology to be developed, the timing is such that we need to implement some “good enough” steps today. Participation by the private sector in an energy market that sends the right price signals is the fastest way to make real progress; this requires a more cooperative, rather than adversarial, relationship with government, and efforts to ensure that free markets send the proper economic signals. The good news is that a solution appears possible. The bad news is that it will not be cheap. The era of cheap energy is over. Pursuing All Available Options Pursuing all available options means that conservation, alternative fuels, and increased production of domestic fuel—fossil and non-fossil—must be accomplished vigorously and simultaneously. Conservation The potential to “find” energy by saving it through conservation is enormous. The USA currently consumes 68.672 barrels of oil per day per 1,000 people, compared to Europe’s 29.42 barrels of oil per day per 1,000 people. Of particular note is that several European countries are able to maintain GDP per capita at, near, or above US levels, with significantly lower energy consumption: Admittedly, Europe has some advantages over the USA, which enable Europeans to use less energy:  Europe is more compact, with less distance between population centers.  Europe has generally better rail and public transit systems.  European homes are generally much smaller, requiring less energy to heat and cool.  Because Europe is so much further north, European summers are cooler, requiring less air conditioning, but this is offset somewhat because European winters are generally cooler, requiring more energy to heat. At the same time, these data suggest considerable potential for improvement. If the USA reduced its oil consumption to European levels, it would require no imports of oil from sources outside NAFTA. More realistically, a report prepared in 2005 for the Natural Resources Defense Council suggested that the United States could save an average of 2.5 million barrels per day by 2015 (Bordetsky, 2005). The proposed approach includes:  Providing tax incentives to auto manufacturers to retool to build more energy-efficient vehicles  Increasing the Corporate Adjusted Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards  Requiring replacement tires and motor oil to be at least as fuel efficient as original equipment tires and motor oil;  Requiring efficiency improvements in heavy-duty trucks;  Supporting smart growth and better transportation choices.  Expanding industrial efficiency programs to focus on oil use reduction and adopting standards for petroleum heating;  Replacing chemical feedstocks with bioproducts through research and development and government procurement of bioproducts; Upgrading air traffic management systems so aircraft follow the most-efficient routes; and  Promoting residential energy savings with a focus on oil-heat. Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer has proposed a revenue-neutral consumption tax on gasoline to encourage conservation (Krauthammer, 2009). The principle behind this proposal is that a substantial tax be added to the price of motor fuel, with an offsetting reduction in the payroll tax. A driver who drove a lesser number of miles, or utilized a more fuel-efficient vehicle, than the standard would realize a net income from this approach. A variation of this approach is that revenue neutrality should apply to a majority of the tax, with the remainder comprising a net revenue stream that could be used to fund alternatives or research or infrastructure to reduce the use of oil. The savings resulting from the imposition of such a tax are not easily quantifiable, but reductions in consumption in response to the 2008 price spike would suggest that this could save at least 1 million barrels a day. **Alternatives** In the long run, the development of green energy technology **will make the biggest difference in** reducing or **eliminating** our **dependence** up**on** foreign, and even domestic, **oil.** The United States’ energy policy needs a more forceful approach to making alternative energy sources mainstream (Toal, 2008). **Oil** is a natural resource and **will deplete** in time and as the problem of global warming becomes more severe, the need for alternative fuel becomes more and more imperative (Luchansky & Monks, 2009). Unfortunately, in the short run all alternative fuels suffer from two basic shortcomings:  Because the vast majority of oil is used for transportation, translating alternative energy into an alternative for oil is a difficult proposition.  Alternatives compare poorly to traditional energy sources in at least one of the following areas: o Scale o Infrastructure o Price The relevant question, as stated by Richard Heinberg, ultimately becomes, “To what degree can any given non-petroleum energy source, or combination of sources enable industrial civilization to survive the end of oil?” (Heinberg, 2006, p.138) Heinberg further notes that the advantages of oil as an energy commodity, and by implication the disadvantages of alternatives, are that oil is:  Easily transported (liquid fuels are more easily transported than solids such as coal or gases such as methane, and may be carried in ships far more easily than can be gases);  Energy-dense (gasoline contains roughly 40 kilowatt-hours per gallon);  Capable of being refined into several fuels (including gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel) suitable for a variety of applications; and  Suitable for a variety of uses (including transportation, heating, and the production of chemicals and other materials) Because of the above limitations, the use of alternatives must be managed very carefully to obtain maximum advantage. As noted above, Brazil gets 50% of its “gasoline” and over 40% of its motor fuels from Biofuels. An equivalent ratio here would mean somewhere between 5 and 6 million barrels per day from Biofuels. That level is clearly achievable, with relatively inexpensive modifications to automobiles to enable flex fuel operations. The US currently gets about 1 million barrels a day from **corn ethanol**, and **further growth expectations for that market are limited. The quickest possibility of a material impact** probably **lies with sugarcane ethanol from Latin America.** Estimates are that as much as **10% of world gasoline usage could be replaced with sugar cane ethanol using current technology** (Goldemberg, 2007). Ron **Soligo** has **estimated the potential** for sugar cane ethanol from Latin America **to be** 2.5 to **3 million barrels per day**, depending on amount of land dedicated and yields obtained (Soligo and Jaffe, 2008). **If** the **trade sanctions with Cuba were lifted,** Juan Tomás Sanchez of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy estimates that **Cuba** alone **could supply** up to **3.2 billion gallons of ethanol annually** (200,000 barrels/day, or 1% of total U.S. energy consumption), while Cuba expert Jorge Hernandez Fonseca projects a more modest production figure around 2 billion gallons per year (Elledge, 2009). The difficulty arises because the current sanctions make the acquisition of accurate information more difficult. Since Cuban sugar production has declined from 44 million tons/year in 1950 to 11 million tons/year today (Zuurbier, 2008), significant upside potential is obvious. These impacts are substantially larger than any other steps under consideration, except perhaps the “drill here, drill now” option. We would still be **importing, but it would be from countries that are closer and have more in common than areas in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world. The existence of a new cash crop in Latin America could dramatically improve their economies, reducing the pressure from illegal immigration, and could also provide farmers with an alternative to marijuana, cocaine, and other plants that are the source of many drugs currently being smuggled into the U.S. Moreover, the ability to use ethanol as a substitute for gasoline would introduce** at least some **elasticity** in**to** the gasoline **consumption** model, there**by limiting the exposure to oil price shocks in the future.** The EPA estimates that use of **sugar cane ethanol could reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 61%**, compared to 21% for corn ethanol (EPA, 2011). Additional ethanol supplies could be obtained from domestic sugar cane and sugar beets. Estimating the potential production from these sources is difficult, but perhaps another 500,000 barrels per day would be possible. That would mean a total of 4 million barrels per day from ethanol, slightly less than the 40% number, but a significant reduction in oil consumption. Additionally, **this would enable** the installation of significant **ethanol infrastructure now, to be in place** already **when** more exotic **forms of ethanol, like cellulosic, become commercially viable.** Incurring those **costs now would** actually **reduce the commercial viability threshold for the exotic sources of ethanol, as they become available.** The arguments against importing ethanol to add to domestic production center around the negative point that the US would still be importing. However, several counter-arguments should be kept in mind:  The proposed approach makes full use of domestic ethanol production capability, so **no domestic enterprise is harmed.**  Importing from Central America, the Caribbean, and South America places our energy supplies in far less jeopardy than importing from Asia and Africa.  The development of an additional lucrative cash crop would aid Latin American economies; in addition to being a good neighbor, the US should also see some relief with its drug and immigration issues along its southern border.  **Ethanol would be the first true alternative to oil**, and having it developed commercially in sufficient volumes would offer some elasticity to the oil-pricing problem, and provide some leverage against oil price spikes.

**Scenario One is the Economy –**

**2008 proves high oil prices discourage consumer spending and cause inflation – cheap alt energy is key to prevent global economic collapse and promote growth**

**Rubin, 12** (Jeff Rubin is a Canadian economist and author. He is a former chief economist at CIBC World Markets. Rubin had worked at CIBC World Markets and its predecessors since 1988, and served as chief economist from 1992 to 2009, “How High Oil Prices Will Permanently Cap Economic Growth,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-23/how-high-oil-prices-will-permanently-cap-economic-growth.html>, Sep 23, 2012)

**For most of the last century, cheap oil powered global economic growth. But in the last decade, the price of oil has quadrupled, and that shift will permanently shackle the growth potential of the world’s economies. The countries guzzling the most oil are taking the biggest hits to potential economic growth. That’s sobering news for the U.S., which consumes almost a fifth of the oil used in the world every day. Not long ago, when oil was $20 a barrel, the U.S. was the locomotive of global economic growth;** the federal government was running budget surpluses; the jobless rate at the beginning of the last decade was at a 40-year low. **Now, growth is stalled, the** [**deficit**](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FDEBOGDP:IND) **is more than $1 trillion** and almost 13 million Americans are unemployed. **And the U.S. isn’t the only country getting squeezed. From Europe to** [**Japan**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/japan/)**, governments are struggling to restore growth. But the economic remedies being used are doing more harm than good, based as they are on a fundamental belief that economic growth can return to its former strength. Central bankers and policy makers have fail**ed **to** fully **recognize the suffocating impact of $100**-a-barrel **oil.** Running huge budget deficits and keeping borrowing costs at record lows are only compounding current problems. **These policies cannot be long-term substitutes for cheap oil because an economy can’t grow if it can no longer afford to burn the fuel on which it runs.** The end of growth means governments will need to radically change how economies are managed. Fiscal and monetary policies need to be recalibrated to account for slower potential growth rates. **Energy Source Oil provides more than a third of the energy we use on the planet every day, more than any other energy source. And you can draw a straight line between oil consumption and gross-domestic- product growth. The more oil we burn, the faster the global economy grows. On average over the last four decades, a 1 percent bump in world oil consumption has led to a 2 percent increase in global GDP. That means if GDP increased 4 percent a year -- as it often did before the 2008 recession -- oil consumption was increasing by 2 percent a year. At $20 a barrel, increasing annual oil consumption by 2 percent seems reasonable enough. At $100 a barrel,** it becomes easier to see how **a 2 percent increase in fuel consumption is enough to make an economy collapse.** Fortunately, the reverse is also true. When our economies stop growing, less oil is needed. For example, after the big decline in 2008, global oil demand actually fell for the first time since 1983. That’s why the best cure for high [oil prices](http://topics.bloomberg.com/oil-prices/) is high oil prices. When prices rise to a level that causes an economic crash, lower prices inevitably follow. **Over the last four decades, each time oil prices have spiked, the global economy has entered a recession.** Consider the first oil shock, after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ Arab members turned off the taps on roughly 8 percent of the world’s oil supply by cutting shipments to the U.S. and other Israeli allies. Crude prices spiked, and by 1974, [real GDP](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/EHGDUSY:IND) in the U.S. had shrunk by 2.5 percent. The second OPEC oil shock happened during Iran’s revolution and the subsequent war with Iraq. Disruptions to Iranian production during the revolution sent crude prices higher, pushing the North American economy into a [recession](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USRINDEX:IND) for the first half of 1980. A few months later, Iran’s war with Iraq shut off 6 percent of world oil production, sending North America into a double-dip recession that began in the spring of 1981. Kuwait Invasion When [Saddam Hussein](http://topics.bloomberg.com/saddam-hussein/) invaded [Kuwait](http://topics.bloomberg.com/kuwait/) a decade later, oil prices doubled to $40 a barrel, an unheard-of level at the time. The first [Gulf War](http://topics.bloomberg.com/gulf-war/) disrupted almost 10 percent of the world’s oil supply, sending major oil-consuming countries into a recession in the fall of 1990. Guess what oil prices were doing in 2008, when the world fell into the deepest recession since the 1930s? From trading around $30 a barrel in 2004, **oil prices marched steadily higher before hitting a peak of $147 a barrel in the summer of 2008. Unlike past oil price shocks, this time there wasn’t even a supply disruption to blame. The spigot was wide open. The problem was, we could no longer afford to buy what was flowing through it. There are many ways an oil shock can hurt an economy. When prices spike, most of us have little choice but to open our wallets. Paying more for oil means we have less cash to spend on food, shelter, furniture, clothes, travel and pretty much anything else. Expensive oil, coupled with the average American’s refusal to drive less, leaves a lot less money for the rest of the economy. Worse, when oil prices go up, so does inflation. And when inflation goes up, central banks respond by raising** [**interest rates**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/interest-rates/) **to keep prices in check.** From 2004 to 2006, U.S. energy inflation ran at 35 percent, according to the [Consumer Price Index](http://topics.bloomberg.com/consumer-price-index/). In turn, overall inflation, as measured by the CPI, accelerated from 1 percent to almost 6 percent. **What happened next was a fivefold bump in interest rates that devastated the massively leveraged U.S. housing market. High**er **rates popped the speculative housing bubble, which brought down the global economy. Unfortunately, this pattern of oil-driven inflation is with us again. And world** [**food prices**](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FAOFOODI:IND) **are being affected.** According to the food-[price index](http://topics.bloomberg.com/price-index/) tracked by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the cost of food rose almost 40 percent from 2009 to the beginning of 2012. And since 2002, the FAO’s food-price index, which measures a basket of five commodity groups (meat, dairy, cereals, oils and fats, and sugar), is up about 150 percent. Food Prices **A double whammy of rising oil and food prices means inflation will be here sooner than anyone would like to think. Rising inflation rates in China and India are a clear signal that those economies are growing at an unsustainable pace. China has made GDP growth of more than 8 percent a priority but needs to recalibrate its thinking to recognize the damping effects of high oil prices.** Growth might not stall entirely, but **clocking double-digit gains is no longer feasible, at least without triggering a calamitous increase in inflation**. If China and India, the new engines of global economic growth, are forced to adopt anti-inflationary monetary policies, the ripple effects for resource-based economies such as [Canada](http://topics.bloomberg.com/canada/), [Australia](http://topics.bloomberg.com/australia/) and [Brazil](http://topics.bloomberg.com/brazil/) will be felt in a hurry. **Triple-digit oil prices will end the lofty economic hopes of India and China**, which are looking to achieve the same sort of sustained growth that [North America](http://topics.bloomberg.com/north-america/) and Europe enjoyed in the postwar era. There is an unavoidable obstacle that puts such ambitions out of reach: Today’s oil isn’t flowing from the same places it did yesterday. More importantly, it’s not flowing at the same cost. **Conventional oil production, the easy-to-get-at stuff from the** [**Middle East**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/middle-east/) **or west Texas, hasn’t increased in more than five years. And that’s with record crude prices giving explorers all the incentive in the world to drill.** According to the [International Energy Agency](http://topics.bloomberg.com/international-energy-agency/), **conventional production has already peaked and is set to decline steadily over the next few decades.** That doesn’t mean there won’t be any more oil. New reserves are being found all the time in new places. What the decline in conventional production does mean, though, is that **future economic growth will be fueled by expensive oil from nonconventional sources such as the** [**tar sands**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/tar-sands/)**, offshore wells in the deep waters of the world’s oceans and even oil shales,** which come with environmental costs that range from carbon-dioxide emissions to potential groundwater contamination. **And even if new supplies are found, what matters to the economy is the cost of getting that supply flowing.** It’s not enough for the global [energy industry](http://topics.bloomberg.com/energy-industry/) simply to find new caches of oil; **the crude must be affordable.** Triple-digit prices make it profitable to tap ever-more-expensive sources of oil, but the prices needed to pull this crude out of the ground will throw our economies right back into a recession. **The energy industry’s task is not simply to find oil, but also to find stuff we can afford to burn. And that’s where the industry is failing. Each new barrel we pull out of the ground is costing us more than the last. The resources may be there for the taking, but our economies are already telling us we can’t afford the cost.**

**Sugar cane ethanol solves – extremely efficient**

**Newsweek, 7** [“Sugar Rush,” Newsweek, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/04/15/sugar-rush.html>, accessed 79/13]

He won't be the last. Thanks to global climate change, sugar now is in big demand. The drum-beat of alarm over global warming has set businesses clamoring for a piece of the sugar-cane action. There are plenty of other ways to make ethanol, of course, and scientists the world over are busy tinkering with everything from switchgrass to sweet potatoes. U.S. farmers make it from corn, but with the scarcity of arable land there's just so much they can plant without crowding out other premium crops, like soy beans. (Meantime, **the combination of limited land and surging demand have sent corn prices through the roof**). **So** far **nothing beats sugarcane**—which grows in the tropics—**for an abundant, cheap source of energy**. **Unlike beets or corn**, **which** are confined to temperate zones and **must be transformed into carbohydrates before they can be converted into sugar and finally alcohol, sugarcane is already halfway there**. That means the sugar barons like Ometto spend much less energy than the competition, not to mention money. The moral imperative of finding a substitute for fossil fuels has lent an air of respectability to new ventures to produce biofuels from sugar—a marked contrast to the sugar barons of old, known for their ruthless ways and their appetite for taxpayers' money. "The distillers who ten years ago were the bandits of agribusiness are becoming national and world heroes," Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula declared recently. **"[E]thanol and biodiesel are more than an answer to our dangerous 'addiction' to fossil fuels. This is the beginning of a reassessment of the global strategy to protect our environment."**

**Two Impacts –**

**First, economic collapse causes nuclear war**

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Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism. One symptom that makes such a scenario plausible has become visible. Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline. Anger (directed towards the neo-colonialist or pro-Israeli West or – especially recently – domestic authoritarian regimes) has also been associated with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist and secular movements. 10 Despite relative popular optimism, anger can also be detected in Asia, hand in hand with chauvinism and a sense of lack of appropriate recognition by others, stemming from a self-perception of rising influence and power.

**Second, boosting economic competitiveness bolsters hegemony and solves war**

**Khalilzad 11** – Bush’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN and former director policy planning at the DOD (Zalmay, “The Economy and National Security”, National Review, 2-8-11, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>)

Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep [financial crisis](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad), not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual [interest payments](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial [tax increases](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance [economic growth](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?pg=2) and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.

**U.S. pursuit of heg is locked-in**

Zach **Dorfman 12**, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, May 18, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

**Scenario Two is Iran –**

**Iran sanctions are insufficient – they’re close to WMDs**

**Katzmann 7/26** (Dr. Kenneth Katzmann has served in government and the private sector as an analyst in Persian Gulf affairs, with special emphasis on Iran and Iraq. In his current position, Dr. Katzman analyzes U.S. policy and legislation on the Persian Gulf region for members of Congress and their staffs. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from New York University, CRS Report – “Iran Sanctions”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>, July 26, 2013)

**There is a consensus that U.S. and U.N. sanctions have not, to date, accomplished their core strategic objective of compelling Iran to verifiably limit its nuclear development to purely peaceful purposes.** By all accounts—the United States, the P5+1, the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—**Iran has not complied with the applicable provisions of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring that outcome**. Five rounds of P5+1—**Iran talks during 2012 and thus far in 2013**, the latest of which took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan during April 5-6, 2013, **produced no breakthroughs. However, on June 14, 2013, Iranians elected the relatively moderate mid-ranking cleric Hassan Rouhani as President; he ran on a platform of achieving an easing of sanctions. That outcome is likely only in the event there is a nuclear compromise.** Rouhani was chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-5—a time when Iran did reach agreements with three European countries and temporarily suspended uranium enrichment. The P5+1 countries met on July 16, 2013 and expressed hope to resume negotiations with Iran “as soon as possible” after Rouhani’s August 4, 2013 inauguration. The nuclear talks are discussed in greater detail in CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman. Counter-Proliferation Effects **A related issue is whether the cumulative sanctions have directly set back Iran’s nuclear efforts by making it difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills.** Some U.S. officials have asserted that, coupled with mistakes and difficulties in Iran, sanctions have slowed Iran’s nuclear efforts by making it more difficult and costly for Iran to acquire key materials and equipment for its enrichment program.64 However, **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA**) **reports have said that Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium more rapidly continues to expand, as does its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium. And, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified on March 12, 2013, that Iran “is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal.”**

**Dependence inhibits the U.S. from imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iran – they can leverage their oil production. Watered-down sanctions allow prolif.**

**Hannah, 12** (John Hannah is a contributor to Foreign Policy's Shadow Government blog and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Energy insecurity: How oil dependence undermines America's effort to stop the Iranian bomb,” [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/12/ energy\_insecurity\_how\_oil\_dependence\_undermines\_america\_s\_effort\_to\_stop\_the\_irania](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/12/%20energy_insecurity_how_oil_dependence_undermines_america_s_effort_to_stop_the_irania), October 12, 2012)

**Concerns about oil prices** have often **badly distort**ed **U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The most acute example is the effort to pressure Iran to give up** its **nuclear weapons ambitions. U.S. policymakers have long known that the most effective step we could take against the mullahs is to cut off Iran's oil sales and starve them of the enormous revenues they need to keep their repressive regime afloat. Yet for years, first President Bush and then President Obama fiercely resisted sanctioning the Islamic Republic's petroleum sector. The reason? Because they quite legitimately feared that removing Iran**ian **crude from the market would disrupt global supplies and trigger a devastating price shock. Only in late 2011, with Iran rapidly approaching the nuclear threshold, did Congress finally steamroll the administration by forcing through legislation that targeted Iranian oil. Even then, implementation of the sanctions was watered down. The administration was given a six-month grace period to assess the possible impact that sanctions would have on the global oil market. And rather than demanding that customers of Iranian oil end their purchases entirely, countries were granted waivers from U.S. sanctions if they only "significantly reduced" their buy -- which in practice required them to cut back between 15 and 20 percent. While the U.S. effort, together with complimentary EU sanctions, have no doubt had a major effect on Iran's economy -- reducing its oil exports by as much as 50 percent -- a full embargo would have be**en **far more impactful and the obvious course of action for Washington to pursue if not for the countervailing concern about oil markets. In the meantime, the Iran**ian regime **continues to pocket perhaps $3 billion per month from the million or so barrels of oil that it still exports daily, all the while pressing ahead with its nuclear program. America doesn't have a higher national security priority than stopping the world's most dangerous regime from going nuclear. And yet the sad reality is that our dependence on oil has for years, and to our great peril, systematically deterred us from fully deploying the most powerful tool in our arsenal -- all-out sanctions on Iran's petroleum sector -- for resolving the crisis peacefully.** Not surprisingly, that underlying logic applies in spades when it comes to any discussion about the possible use of force against Iran, where predictions of oil spiking to an economy-crippling $200 per barrel are commonplace. The fact that our oil vulnerability has put such severe constraints on our freedom-of-maneuver to address the most pressing national security threat we face is deeply troubling. The big question is whether we can do anything about it. Admittedly, history doesn't offer much reason for optimism. For almost 40 years, successive U.S. presidents have promised to tackle the problem with very little to show for it. Of course, what's different today is that the United States is experiencing an oil and gas boom that promises to transform our energy landscape in very fundamental ways. Thanks to American ingenuity and technology, U.S. production is poised to increase dramatically over the next decade, after years of steep decline. As Governor Romney has correctly emphasized, through close cooperation with democratic allies in Canada and Mexico, the goal of energy self-sufficiency for North America may well be within reach -- an unthinkable prospect just a few years ago, and one whose benefits in terms of job creation and economic growth could be quite profound. In addition to the potential economic windfall, however, **we also need to be think**ing **hard about how we can best exploit the coming energy boom to really enhance U.S. national security. That's a much more difficult task. The fact is that because there's a global market for oil, Middle East crises are likely to threaten the U.S. economy with major price spikes no matter how much of our own crude we produce. Just look at Canada and England. While both are oil independent, they remain exposed to the same price volatility that currently afflicts the United States. Their economies will be no more insulated than ours if a war with Iran sends the cost of oil through the roof. It seems that what really needs to be part of the mix is a viable, bipartisan, market-driven strategy for reducing the monopoly that oil has over our transportation sector. If a sensible way could be found to begin moving some significant portion of U.S. cars and trucks to run on cheaper, domestically produced alternative fuel**s -- natural gas, m**ethanol**, electric -- it **would largely eliminate the sword** of Damocles that **Middle Eastern tyrannies like Iran now hold over the West's economic wellbeing and its strategic decision-making. That would put us on the path toward true energy independence, and restore to the United States a degree of flexibility, leverage, and strength to pursue** its **interests** and values **abroad, especially in the Middle East, that we have not known for at least a generation.**

**Iran prolif would destabilize the Middle East leading to a war that entangles every major power – the world is uniquely vulnerable to threats posed by prolif now**

**Heisbourg 12**—chairman of the council of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (Francois, 3/4/12, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION – LOOKING BACK, THINKING AHEAD: HOW BAD WOULD THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE?,” http://www.npolicy.org/article\_file/Nuclear\_Proliferation\_-\_Looking\_Back\_Thinking\_Ahead\_How\_Bad\_Would\_the\_Further\_Spread\_of\_Nuclear\_Weapons\_Be.pdf, RBatra)

Demand is currently focusing on two regions, the Middle East and East Asia (broadly defined) and involves states and, potentially, non-state actors. **In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear program is the focus of** the most **intense concerns. A potential consequence in proliferation terms would be to lead regional rivals of Iran to acquire nuc**lear weapon**s in term**: this concern was vividly in 2007 by the then President of France, Jacques Chirac (19) who specifically mentioned **Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The likelihood of such a “proliferation chain-reaction” may have been increased by** President **Obama’s recent repudiation of containment** as an option (20): **short of Iran being persuaded or forced to abandon its nuclear ambitions, the neighboring states would** presumably **have to contemplate security options other than a Cold War style US defense guarantee. Given prior attempts by Iraq, Syria and Libya to become nuclear powers, the probability of a multipolar nuclear Middle East has to be rated as high** in case Iran is perceived as having acquired a military nuclear capability. Beyond the Middle East, the possibility of civil war in nuclear-armed Pakistan leading to state failure and the possibility of nukes falling out of the hands of an effective central government. There are historical precedents for such a risk, most notably, but not only(21)in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union: timely and lasting action by outside powers, such as the US with the Nunn-Lugar initiative, and the successor states themselves has prevented fissile material from falling into unauthorized hands in significant quantities. Pakistan could pose similar problems in a singularly more hostile domestic environment. As things stand, non-state actors, such as post-Soviet mafiya bosses (interested in resale potential) or Al Qaeda (22) have sought, without apparent success, to benefit from opportunities arising from nuclear disorder in the former USSR and Central Asia. Mercifully, the price Al Qaeda was ready to pay was way below the going rate (upwards of hundreds of $million) for the sorts of services provided by the A.Q.Khan network (see below)to some of his clients. Although North Korea’s nuclear ambitions appear to be both more self-centered and more containable than is the case for Iran, the possibility of state collapse in combination with regional rivalry leave no room for complacency. More broadly **we are facing the prospect of a multipolar nuclear Middle East, linked to an uncertain nuclear Pakistan already part of a nuclear South Asia tied via China to the Korean nexus in which nuclear America and Russia also have a stake**. More broadly still, **such a nuclear arc-of-crisis from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan, would presumably imply the breakdown of the NPT regime**, or at least its reversion to the sort of status it had during the Seventies, when many of its currently significant members had not yet joined (23), unloosening both the demand and supply sides of proliferation. On the supply side, **“old style” proliferation relied on official cooperation between first-generation nuclear or nuclearizing powers**, of which the Manhattan project was a forerunner (with American, British and Canadian national contributions and multinational scientific teams), followed inter alia by post-1956 French-Israeli, post-1958 US-UK, pre- 1958 USSR-China cooperation. If India relied heavily on the “unwitting cooperation” , notably on the part of Canada and the US involved in the Atoms for Peace CIRUS research reactor, Pakistan set up the first dedicated, broad spectrum, crossborder trading network to make up for the weakness of its limited industrial base. This import-focused organization thus went beyond traditional espionage-aided efforts (as practiced by the USSR during and after the Manhattan project) or case-by-case purloining or diversion of useful material on the global market (as practiced by Israeli operatives). Even before the Pakistani network had fulfilled its primary task of supplying the national program, it began its transformation into an export-oriented venture. Libya, Iran, North Korea and a fourth country which remains officially unnamed became the main outlets of what became the world’s first private-sector (albeit government originated and ,presumably, supported)proliferation company which was only wound down after strong Western pressure on Pakistan after 9/11. Although the by-now richly documented A.Q.Khan network (24) appears to have ceased to function in its previous incarnation, it has powerfully demonstrated that **there is an international market for proliferation which** other **operators can expect to exploit**. Furthermore, **budding, resource-weak nuclear powers have a strong incentive to cover the cost of their investment by selling or bartering their nuclear-related assets, including delivery systems**. The fruits of state-tostate cooperation between Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are clearly apparent in the close-to-identical genealogy of their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of the No- Dong/Ghauri/Shahab families displayed in military parades and test launches. Not all such cooperation consists of televised objects. Even in the absence of game-changing breakthroughs, **technical trends facilitate both demand and supply-side proliferation**. For the time being, **the plutonium route towards the bomb remains essentially as easy and as difficult as from the earliest years** of the nuclear era. Provided a country runs a (difficult-to-hide) research or a power reactor from which low-irradiated fuel can be downloaded at will (such as CANDUtype natural uranium reactors), reprocessing is a comparatively straightforward and undemanding task. Forging and machining a multiple-isotope metal which is notorious for its numerous physical states and chemical toxicity is a substantial challenge, with the companion complications of devising a reliable implosion mechanism. Nuclear testing is highly desirable to establish confidence in the end-result. **Opportunities for taking the plutonium-proliferation road may increase somewhat as new techniques** (such as pyro-processing) **come on stream. Developments in the enriched uranium field have been more substantial in facilitating proliferation**. The development of lighter and more efficient centrifuges make it easier for a state to extract enriched uranium speedily in smaller and less visible facilities. Dealing with the resulting military-level HEU is a comparatively undemanding task. The long-heralded advent of industrially effective and reliable laser enrichment technology may eventually further increase ease of access. Downstream difficulties would still remain. Although implosion-mechanisms are not mandatory, they are desirable in order both to reduce the critical mass of U235 for a nuclear explosion and to make for a lighter and smaller more-readily deliverable weapons package. In sum, incremental improvements increase the risk of proliferation. However, non-state actors are not yet, and will not be on the basis of known technical trends, in a position to master the various steps of the two existing military nuclear fuel cycles, which remain the monopoly of states. Nonstate actors would need the active complicity from (or from accomplices within) states, or benefit from the windfall of state collapse, to acquire a military nuclear capability. The threat of nuclear terrorism continues to be subordinated to developments involving state actors, a remark which is not meant to be reassuring since such developments (see above) are increasingly likely as proliferation spreads to new states and as state failure threatens in the ‘arc of proliferation’ extending from the Mediterranean to North-East Asia. Furthermore, non-state actors can be satisfied with levels of nuclear reliability and performance which states could not accept. A difficult-to-deliver or fizzle-prone nuclear device would not provide a state with the level of deterrence needed to shield it from pre-emptive or retaliatory action, whereas a terrorist group would not be seeking such immunity. A road or ship-delivered imperfect device, which would be closer to a radiological bomb than to a fully-fledged atomic weapon would provide its non-state owners with immense potential. The road to a non-state device does not need to be as well-paved. NUCLEAR FUTURES ‘New’ lessons from a revisited past and current trends in nuclear proliferation, will tie into a number of characteristics of contemporary international relations with potentially destabilizing consequences, leading to an increasing likelihood of nuclear use. **Four** such **characteristics will be singled out here both because of their relevance to nuclear crisis management** and because of their growing role in the world system in the age of globalization: - Strategic upsets - Limits of imagination - Unsustainable strains - Radical aims **The** 2008 **French** Defence and National Security **White Paper** (25) **developed the concept of** ‘ruptures stratégiques’ (**strategic upsets) to describe the growing tendency of the world system to generate rapid, unexpected, morphing upsets of international security as a consequence of globalization** broadly defined against the backdrop of urbanizing populations generating economic growth and environmental and resource constraints. In themselves, such upsets are not novel (see inter alia, a pandemic such as the Black Death in 1348-49, the Great Depression not to mention World Wars or indeed the major and benign strategic upset of 1989-1991) but the very nature of globalization and the relationship between human activity and the Earth’s ability to sustain them) mean more, and more frequent as well as more complex upsets. If this reading is correct –and the Great financial crisis, the Arab revolutions, the accession of China to superpower status can be mentioned as examples which followed the publication of the White paper- ,then the consequences in the nuclear arena will be twofold. First, **nuclear doctrines and dispositions which were conceived under a set of circumstances** (such as the Cold War or the India-Pakistan balance of power) **may rapidly find themselves overtaken by events**. For instance **it is easier to demonstrate that US and Russian nuclear forces still visibly bear the imprint of their 1950s template than it is to demonstrate their optimal adaptation to post-post-Cold War requirements**. Second, **more challenges to international security and of a largely unforeseeable nature mean greater strains placed on the ability of nuclear powers to manage crises against the backdrop of their possession of nuclear weapons**. In many, indeed most, cases, such ‘ruptures stratégiques’ will no doubt be handled with nuclear weapons appearing as irrelevant: hypothetical security consequences of an epidemic (such as the interhuman transmission of the H5N1 bird flu virus) or prospective conflicts resulting from climate change do not have prima facie nuclear aspects. But beyond the reminder that we don’t know that as a fact, **the probability is**, under the ‘rupture stratégique’ hypothesis, **that there will be more occasions for putting all crisis management, including nuclear, to the test.** **Human societies** tend to **lack the imagination to think through**, and to act upon, **what have become known as ‘black swan’ events** (26): **that which has never occurred** (or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) **is deemed not be in the field of reality, and to which must be added eventualities which are denied because their consequences are to awful to contemplate**. The extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11) bear testimony to this hard-wired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of growing salience if not for the recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945. **Non-use of nuclear weapons may be taken for granted rather than being an absolute taboo.** Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs (27) may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent (and often compelling) historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire which downplay the role of the atomic bombings in comparison to early research can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the intention (28). However desirable it has been, **the end of** atmospheric **nuclear testing** (29) **has removed** for more than three decades the **periodic reminders which such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons. There is a real and growing risk that we forget what was obvious to those who first described in 1941 the unique nature of yet-to-be produced nuclear weapons** (30). The risk is no doubt higher in those states for which the history of World War II has little relevance and which have not had the will or the opportunity to wrestle at the time or ex post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. **Unsustainable strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. Tight geographical constraints** –**with**, for instance, **New Delhi and Islamabad located within 300 miles of each other-; nuclear multipolarity against the backdrop of multiple, criss-crossing, sources of tension in the Middle East (as opposed to the relative simplicity of the US-Soviet confrontation); the existence of doctrines** (such as India’s ‘**cold start’**) **and force postures** (such as Pakistan’s broadening array of battlefield nukes) **which rest on the expectation of early use; the role of non-state actors as aggravating or triggering factors** when they are perceived as operating with the connivance of an antagonist state ( in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914; in the future, Hezbollah operatives launching rockets with effect against Israel or Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos doing a ‘Bombay’ redux in India?) : **individually or in combination, these factors test crisis management capabilities more severely than anything seen during the Cold War** with the partial exception of the Cuban missile crisis. **Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear arsenals in Cold War Central Europe**, with their iffy weapons’ safety and security arrangements, **were less of a challenge: the US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not putting US and Soviet territory and capitals at risk. It may be argued that** these **risk factors are known to potential protagonists and that they therefore will** be led to **avoid** the sort of **nuclear brinksmanship** which characterized US and Soviet behavior during the Cold War in crises such as the Korean war, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom Kippur war. **Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence, rather to the contrary**. And were such restraint to feed into nuclear policy and crisis planning –along the lines of apparently greater US and Soviet nuclear caution from the mid-Seventies onwards-, the fact would remain that **initial intent rarely resists the strains of a complex, multi-actor confrontation between inherently distrustful antagonists**. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that during the 1980s, there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West was preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear which in turn fed into Soviet policies and dispositions (31). **The Cold War** was a set of **crises and misunderstandings** which **came within a whisker of a nuclear holocaust; India and Pakistan’s nuclear standoff is deeply unstable** not least as a result of the interaction with non-state actors; **a multipolar nuclear Middle East would make the Cuban missile crisis look easy in comparison.** **Great conflicts tend to occur when one or several of the antagonists views the status quo as sufficiently undesirable and/or unsustainable** **to prompt forceful pro-action**. Notwithstanding widespread perceptions to the contrary, this was not the case of the USSR and the United States during the Cold War. **The US had chosen a policy of containment**, as opposed to roll-back, of the Soviet Empire within its limits established as a result of World War II. **The Soviet Union** seized targets of opportunity outside of its 1945 area of control but **avoided direct confrontation with US forces**. Messianic language from the USSR on the global victory of communism or from the US about the end of the Evil Empire did not take precedence over the prime Soviet concern of preserving the Warsaw Pact and the US pursuit of containment – and, no less crucially, **their mutual confidence that they could achieve these aims without going to war one with the other. No such generalization can be made about the Middle East, a region in which the very existence of a key state** (**Israel) is challenged while others have gone to war with each other** (e.G.Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War of 1990-1991), **or are riven by deep internal conflicts. Actors such as Hezbollah**, with its organic and functional links with Islamic Iran and Alawite Syria **add to the complexities and dangers**. Extreme views and actions vis à vis the strategic status quo are widely prevalent. **Although the India-Pakistan relationship corresponds to something akin to the US-Soviet ‘adversarial partnership’, that does not apply to radical non-state actors prevalent in Pakistan** with more or less tight links to that country’s military intelligence services (ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence). The potential for danger is compounded by the variety of such groups: the Pashtu-related Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Kashmiri-related groups, Jihadi militants from the core provinces of Punjab and Sind… Their common characteristics are extreme radicalism, high levels of operational proficiency, and shared enmity of India. **Their potential for triggering a conflict between the two countries is substantial, above and beyond the intentions of government officials. mean the end of international politics**. As was discussed above, **nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised** at least **two answers** to this question. **First**, as stated above, **leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war**.[[1]](#footnote-1)[55] This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. **As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine.** Indeed, **Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict** (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) **as a way to de-escalate a crisis.** Similarly, **Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India**. And finally, **Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency**. **Second, as was also discussed above leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance**.”[[2]](#footnote-2)[56] **They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games** **of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down**. **Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close**. **And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.**[[3]](#footnote-3)[57] **When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.**

**Contention Two – Brazilian Ecosystems**

**Cuban ethanol solves Cerrado Destruction. We displace bad ethanol expansion from Brazil**

**Specht ‘12**

(Jonathan – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D.,¶ Washington University in St. Louis 2012. “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States” – ExpressO – http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)

B. Environmental Effects of Sugarcane-Based Ethanol **If** future legislation does not revive the United States ethanol tariff that expired at the end of 2011 and **the trade embargo against Cuba is kept in place, Brazil will likely be the primary beneficiary.**109 The argument can be made that Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol is a more environmentally beneficial fuel source than domestic-corn based ethanol, because of the nature of sugarcanebased ethanol (discussed below).110 **Brazilian sugarcane**-based **ethanol comes, however, with** its own set of **environmental consequences.** The full debate over the environmental consequences of the Brazilian biofuel¶ production¶ 111¶ is largely beyond the scope of this Article. Still, the primary issue¶ in this dispute is worth noting, because it accentuates one of the most significant¶ differences between the U.S. corn-based ethanol industry and the potential¶ Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry. In Brazil, the expansion of sugarcane¶ production to meet demand for ethanol production has led to land use changes that parallel the expansion of corn production for ethanol in the United States.¶ Clearing portions of the Amazon rainforest¶ —¶ one of the most significant¶ repositories of carbon on Earth¶ 112¶ —¶ would represent an environmental cost of¶ ethanol production that outweighs its benefits. The Amazon region, however, is¶ largely unsuitable for sugarcane production.¶ 113¶ But, **sugarcane production is**¶ **contributing to destruction of a**nother **sensitive habitat, the bio-diverse Cerrado**¶ savannah **region of Brazil**.¶ 114¶ **Cuban sugar**cane-based **ethanol would have the environmental benefits of**¶ **Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol without its most obvious negative factor,**¶ **damaging habitat in the Cerrado**¶ .¶ The environmental effects of biofuels depend¶ on a number of factors. Whether or not a given type of biofuel is¶ environmentally beneficial “depends on what the fuel is, how and where the¶ biomass was produced, what else the land could have been used for, how the¶ fuel was processed and how it is used.”¶ 115¶ Taken together, these **factors point to**¶ **sugar**cane-based **ethanol grown in Cuba as one of the most environmentally friendly biofuel**s possible. ¶ The environmental benefits of using sugarcane to produce ethanol are¶ numerous. First, it is much more energy efficient to derive ethanol from¶ sugarcane than corn. Making ethanol from corn only creates approximately 1.3¶ times the amount of energy used to produce it, but **making ethanol from¶ sugarcane creates approximately eight times the amount of energy used to produce it.**¶ 116¶ Second, **unlike** much of the **corn** **presently grown in Great Plains¶ states, sugarcane grown in Latin America does not need to be irrigated.¶ 117¶ Third,¶ sugarcane requires relatively small amounts of** chemical fertilizers, herbicides,¶ and **pesticide**s.¶ 118¶ Fourth, **whereas most U.S. ethanol refineries are powered by**¶ **coal or natural gas**,¶ 119¶ **sugar**cane **ethanol refineries can be powered by**¶ **bagasse**¶ , a¶ natural product left over from the sugar refining process.¶ 120¶ In fact, refineries¶ powered with¶ bagasse¶ can even produce more electricity than they need and sell power back to the electric grid.¶ 121¶ Fifth, although corn can only be planted and¶ harvested once a year, in tropical climates sugarcane can be cut from the same¶ stalks multiple times per year.¶ 122¶ Each of these factors in favor of sugarcane ethanol is true of ethanol from¶ Brazil as well as of any potential ethanol from Cuba. However, there are¶ additional environmental factors that clinch Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol as¶ one of the most environmentally friendly fuel sources available to the United¶ States under current technology.¶ 123¶ First, **because Cuba is closer to the United**¶ **States, transporting ethanol from Cuba to the United States would require less**¶ **energy than transporting ethanol from Brazil** to the United States (especially if it¶ is used in Florida, an option further explored in the section on economic¶ effects).¶ 124¶ Another reason Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol could be one of the most¶ environmentally friendly fuels possible is that **Cuba could produce a significant**¶ **amount of ethanol without any negative impacts on native habitat**. A striking¶ amount of **Cuban ag**ricultural **land** — fifty five percent as of 2007 — **is simply¶ lying fallow and is not cultivated** with anything.¶ 125¶ Although its character may¶ have changed due to years of neglect, **this land is not virgin native habitat like**¶ **the** grasslands of North Dakota or the **Cerrado of Brazil**. Cuba therefore could¶ greatly increase its production of sugarcane, and thus its production of¶ sugarcane-based ethanol, without negative impacts on wildlife habitat. While it¶ is not environmentally perfect — no form of energy is — **Cuban sugar**cane-¶ based **ethanol would raise fewer environmental concerns than the fuel sources it**¶ **would displace**: petroleum, domestic **corn-based ethanol, and Brazilian**¶ **sugar**cane based **ethanol.** **Therefore,** from a purely environmental perspective,¶ **changing U.S**. law and **policy** in order **to promote the importation of Cuban**¶ sugarcane-based **ethanol should be encouraged.**

**Cerrado’s key to global biod – biggest hotspot and important for medical breakthroughs. It’s also a *strong carbon sink* – extensive underground biomass**

**Vitali ‘11**

(Isabella Vitali – Senior Policy Officer, WWF-UK.“Soya and the Cerrado: Brazil’s forgotten jewel – http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/soya\_and\_the\_cerrado.pdf)

**Loss of the Cerrado is of global concern** **not only because**¶ **of its significant contribution to the world’s biodiversity,**¶ **but also because of its importance in terms of climate**¶ **change**. **CO2 emissions associated with the conversion**¶ **of the Cerrado are more than half** the total **emissions of the UK** and probably **already exceed those from Amazon**¶ **deforestation**. **Much less well known than its giant neighbour, the Amazon, the** Brazilian **Cerrado** or¶ woodland-savannah **is an extraordinary ecosystem worthy of global attention,**¶ especially in view of the intense pressure it has suffered and continues to suffer.¶ **Originally covering an area larger than Mexico**, more than 2m sq km, **the Cerrado is**¶ **an extremely diverse landscape occupying the entire central part of Brazil,** thought to¶ be a remnant of the ancient continent that existed at the time of the dinosaurs, before¶ the separation of South America and Africa.25¶ Most of the Cerrado is located on the high plateau of the continent. The ecosystem is¶ characterised by a pronounced dry period, between May and September. This leads¶ to fire-prone conditions in the drought season to which vegetation has adapted over¶ millions of years.26¶ Under the umbrella term Cerrado, **the region** actually **consists of a rich mosaic** of¶ contrasting landscapes **that makes this the most biodiverse** savannah **region on the**¶ **planet**. **No fewer than 11 different categories of landscape have been defined**,¶ including three types of forest; four varieties of ‘true’ savannah with shrubs and¶ sparse, twisted trees; and three separate kinds of grassland.27¶ **The diversity** of landscapes leads to a diversity of plantlife that **qualifies the Cerrado**¶ **to be one of the planet’s biodiversity hotspots**, when combined with the threats which¶ it is facing. A recent checklist of vascular (i.e. flowering) plants in the biome¶ identified more than 11,000 species, of which around **44% are endemic** – that is, they¶ appear nowhere else in the world. **The Cerrado is estimated to contain some 5% of**¶ **the entire Earth’s biodiversity**.28¶ **The plant biodiversity and its long adaptation to adverse conditions make Cerrado vegetation of great interest** and potential high value **for** a wide range of human uses,¶ including for **medicines,** novel food **and** potentially even **crops better suited to future**¶ **conditions under climate change.**29¶ Among the charismatic mammal species to be found in the Cerrado are the giant¶ anteater, giant armadillo, maned wolf and jaguar. More than 800 bird species occur¶ in the biome30 – emblematic birds include the Toco toucan, the rhea or South¶ American ostrich, and various species of macaw.¶ Apart from the great biodiversity, the Cerrado’s position on the high plateau of the¶ continent gives it an important role in safeguarding the water resources of a large¶ part of Brazil and neighbouring countries. This has given it the nickname ‘Brazil’s¶ water tank’: of 12 hydrological regions in the country, six have sources in the Cerrado.¶ In the case of three major river basins – the Tocantins/Araguaia, São Francisco and¶ Paraná-Paraguay (La Plata) – more than 70% of the water resources originate in the¶ Cerrado. Although the Amazon River itself starts in the Andes, some 4% of the water¶ in the Amazon basin flows from tributaries originating in the Cerrado.31¶ **The Cerrado** also **has global importance because of the large stock of carbon stored in**¶ **its** vegetation and **soil.** **Although it would appear to be much sparser than the** well-known **carbon store of the Amazon**, **the Cerrado has been described as a forest**¶ **standing on its head, with** about **70% of biomass underground**.32 **Recent studies suggest the carbon stock of trees, bushes, litter, roots and soil may be nearly double the figure given by** the **I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **C**limate **C**hange (2000), at some¶ 265 tonnes of carbon per hectare.33

**Effects of land conversion spillover to the Amazon and have global ramifications**

**McGowan ‘9**

Chris McGowan is an author and journalist whose interests range across culture, politics, and environmental issues. McGowan has written extensively about Brazil, and been interviewed about Brazil by the BBC, the New York Times, AirTalk, and various NPR affiliates. McGowan was a contributor to The Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture (Charles Scribner's Sons). “The Importance of Being Cerrado: Brazil's Other Huge, Endangered Ecosystem” – Huffington Post – 12-28- 2009 – http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-mcgowan/the-importance-of-being-c\_b\_405442.html

If we lose the Cerrado, we lose the possible medical and other uses that may one day come from the known and unknown species of the biome. In addition, the Cerrado is a large part of the watershed for the mighty San Francisco and Paraguay River systems, and contains 700,000 square kilometers of land located within the Amazon Basin (the total area that drains into the Amazon River system; not to be confused with the Amazon rain forest). **If farmers remove the** native **Cerrado vegetation, ruin its ecosystems,** **and pour fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides** onto hundreds of thousands of square kilometers there, **the Amazon rain forest downstream will suffer from pollution and** a possible **loss of rainfall. Brazil will be despoiling some of its most important water resources**. In addition, **Cerrado deforestation is a major part of** Brazil's **carbon emissions** every year, a problem that must be addressed.

**Two Impact Scenarios –**

**Scenario One is Biodiversity –**

**First, biodiversity is critical to human survival—multiple studies prove.**

**Science Daily 2011** ("Biodiversity Key to Earth's Life-Support Functions in a Changing World," Cites Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg, August 11, <[www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110811084513.htm](http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110811084513.htm)>

**The biological diversity of organisms** on Earth is not just something we enjoy when taking a walk through a blossoming meadow in spring; it **is** also **the basis for countless products and services provided by nature, including food, building materials, and medicines as well as the self-purifying qualities of water and protection against erosion. These so-called ecosystem services are what makes Earth inhabitable for humans. They are based on ecological processes**, such as photosynthesis, the production of biomass, or nutrient cycles. Since biodiversity is on the decline, both on a global and a local scale, researchers are asking the question as to what role the diversity of organisms plays in maintaining these ecological processes and thus in providing the ecosystem's vital products and services. **In an international research group led by Prof**. Dr. Michel Loreau from Canada, **ecologists from ten different universities and research institutes,** including Prof. Dr. Michael Scherer-Lorenzen from the University of Freiburg, **compiled findings from numerous biodiversity experiments and reanalyzed them**. These experiments simulated the loss of plant species and attempted to determine the consequences for the functioning of ecosystems, most of them coming to the conclusion that a higher level of biodiversity is accompanied by an increase in ecosystem processes. However, the findings were always only valid for a certain combination of environmental conditions present at the locations at which the experiments were conducted and for a limited range of ecosystem processes. In a study published in the current issue of the journal Nature, the research group investigated the extent to which the positive effects of diversity still apply under changing environmental conditions and when a multitude of processes are taken into account. They found that 84 percent of the 147 plant species included in the experiments promoted ecological processes in at least one case. **The more years, locations, ecosystem processes, and scenarios of global change** -- such as global warming or land use intensity -- **the experiments took into account, the more plant species were necessary to guarantee the functioning of the ecosystems**. Moreover, **other species were always necessary to keep the ecosystem processes running under the different combinations of influencing factors. These findings indicate that** **much more biodiversity** **is necessary to keep ecosystems functioning in a world that is changing ever faster. The protection of diversity is thus a crucial factor in maintaining Earth's life-support functions.**

**Second, existential pathogens exist as zoonotic diseases – bio-diverse regions key to prevent infection**

**Yule ‘13**

(et al; Jeffrey V. Yule – Herbert McElveen Professor of Applied and Natural Sciences¶ At the School of Biological Sciences, Louisiana Tech University, Published April 2nd – Humanities 2013, 2, 147–159; doi:10.3390/h2020147)

Although one hypothesis explains the recent upswing in emerging infectious disease as a result of an¶ unusual increase in pathogen mutation rates, an alternative hypothesis suggests that **as global biodiversity**¶ **decreases, pathogens shift to new hosts**. The **recent emergence of new infectious diseases has occurred**¶ alongside **a decline in species** numbers unprecedented since the evolution of modern humans. This¶ concurrence raises the possibility of a causal link between the two events and, with even larger future¶ biodiversity declines expected, raises concerns for the future. Various investigators hypothesize that at¶ the boundaries between areas of human habitation and human vacancy, animal biodiversity may¶ prevent nonhuman pathogens from making the evolutionary transition to humans [29,30]. Nonetheless,¶ animals in these areas still act as pathogen reservoirs that may contain organisms with the traits¶ necessary to infect humans, a problem that becomes more acute as biodiversity and animal population¶ sizes dwindle and pathogens or their vectors become more likely to encounter humans [31].¶ **Biodiverse communities may reduce the likelihood of diseases transitioning from nonhuman species**¶ **to humans through a number of factors relating to the dilution effect (e.g., reduced encounters between infectious carriers and uninfected hosts, reduced pathogen transmission from host to vector, and fewer susceptible hosts available for infection) [25,32]. For instance,** **pathogen vectors such as mosquitoes**¶ **and ticks historically occupied habitats characterized by diverse species** populations **that could be targeted for blood meals.** **Since not all these species were susceptible to the pathogens** carried by any¶ given vector, **the likelihood of pathogen success was reduced, with the result that even those rare**¶ **pathogens capable of infecting humans were unlikely to have the opportunity to do so.**¶Recent investigations support the hypothesis that **biodiversity protects humans from emerging**¶ **infectious disease**. Allan et al. [33] investigated regions with varying degrees of songbird diversity and¶ found that as avian community diversity increased, the overall rate of West Nile virus infection¶ decreased in both birds and humans. Since mosquito vectors pass West Nile virus between hosts, their¶ findings are consistent with the dilution effect. In a different context, experimental investigation of¶ Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis, a fungal pathogen that has devastated amphibian species globally,¶ provides additional support for the dilution effect hypothesis. Investigators tested a susceptible North American toad species, both in aquaria where it was the sole inhabitant and in aquaria where it was¶ housed with one or two additional amphibian species with varying susceptibilities to the fungus. The¶ prevalence of fungal infection was highest when only one species was present, intermediate in the¶ presence of two species, and lowest when three species were present [34]. Although further research is¶ necessary, the findings are suggestive and, once again, consistent with the notion that biodiversity¶ reduces the likelihood of infectious diseases crossing species lines.¶ Since the 1940s, **humans** in industrialized nations **have been relatively sheltered from the threat that**¶ **infectious disease once posed**. **Modern antibiotics** and antivirals **have controlled pathogens that once**¶ **devastated human populations, but these drugs often remain effective only briefly. Unprecedentedly¶ large, dense human populations characteristic of modern societies coupled with rapid global travel create a situation in which emerging pathogens can move much more efficiently between hosts**. **Rates of future human mortality from emerging infectious diseases may depend on the levels of biodiversity**¶that remain in unpopulated regions, which suggests that **protection from novel infectious disease may**¶ **be** what has been, until recently, **an overlooked benefit of biodiversity.**¶ **We have assumed that humanity’s future will unfold in a way that avoids** any of a number of **global**¶ **disasters for Homo sapiens** sapiens. **An equally reasonable but less optimistic assessment could take**¶ **exception to that** position**.** A variety of **things could go badly wrong for humanity**. Global human N¶ may not stabilize at or below where it stands now without being pushed there by some form(s) of crisis¶ that result from humans exceeding global K. As a result, anthropogenic factors from the intentionally¶ harmful (e.g., warfare) to the unintentionally disastrous (e.g., agricultural practices leading to topsoil¶ erosion and desertification) could occur singly or in conjunction with one another, with a variety of¶ natural disasters (**e.g.,** volcanic eruptions, earthquakes), and with disasters that straddle the boundary¶ of natural and anthropogenic, the sorts of **scenarios that otherwise could have be**en **avoided or their**¶ **impacts lessened with more forethought** (e.g., **outbreaks of infectious disease** that move easily through¶ dense human population centers and cannot be readily treated due to pathogen drug resistance).¶ Although we cannot rule out such eventualities, **speculation about** the future of **humanity is** inherently¶ **more interesting if it proceeds on the assumption that the species will be** at least moderately **successful**¶ **beyond the short**- to medium-**term.** **However, it may not**, and **the potential failure of our species has considerable biological implications.**

**Second is warming –**

**Warming is anthropogenic. We need *strong carbon sinks***

**Hu ‘9**

(et al – all authors listed. JIA HU = Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Colorado, Boulder. DAVID J. P. MOORE = Department of Geography, King’s College London. SEANP.BURNS = National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). RUSSELL K . MONSON – Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES), University of Colorado, Boulder. “Longer growing seasons lead to less carbon sequestration by a subalpine forest” – Global Change Biology; http://www.mmm.ucar.edu/people/burns/files/gcb10\_hu\_growingseason.pdf)

Human activities, such as the **burning of fossil fuels** and¶ land use changes, **have increased** the atmospheric **CO2** concentration over the past century. **The increase** in CO¶ 2¶ and other greenhouse gases **is very likely to have caused climate warming** at unprecedented rates (IPCC,¶ 2007). **While** approximately **half of the emitted anthropogenic CO2** **stays in the atmosphere**, **the remainder is assimilated into terrestrial** and ocean **ecosystems** (Ca-¶ nadell¶ et al¶ ., 2007). **These natural carbon sinks are vital for sequestering** atmospheric **CO2** , **and yet the strength** and longevity **of these sinks may be diminishing** (Cramer¶ et al¶ ., 2001; Canadell¶ et al¶ ., 2007**). The tendency for ecosystem growing seasons to lengthen in response to climate warming (**Myneni¶ et al¶ ., 1997; Cao & Wood-¶ ward, 1998; Black¶ et al¶ ., 2000) **may enhance the strength of the terrestrial carbon sink**, **and thus diminish the rate of atmospheric CO2 buildup**. An earlier spring, and¶ associated longer growing season may increase the¶ potential time for photosynthetic CO¶ 2¶ uptake by terres-¶ trial ecosystems.

**Mass carbon release is an existential threat via hydrogen sulfide – empirics**

**Ward, 10**

(Peter, PhD, professor of Biology and Earth and Space Sciences at the University of Washington, paleontologist and NASA astrobiologist, Fellow at the California Academy of Sciences, The Flooded Earth: Our Future in a World Without Ice Caps, June 29, 2010)

In the rest of this chapter I will support a contention that within several millennia (or less) the planet will see a changeover of the oceans from their current “mixed” states to something much different and dire. Oceans will become stratified by their oxygen content and temperature, with warm, oxygen-free water lining the ocean basins. Stratified oceans like this in the past (and they were present for most of Earth’s history) have always been preludes to biotic catastrophe. Because the continents were in such different positions at that time, models we use today to understand ocean current systems are still crude when it comes to analyzing the ancient oceans, such as those of the Devonian or Permian Periods. Both times witnessed major mass extinctions, and these extinctions were somehow tied to events in the sea. Yet catastrophic as it was, the event that turned the Canning Coral Reef of Devonian age into the Canning Microbial Reef featured at the start of this chapter was tame compared to that ending the 300 million- to 251 million-year-old Permian Period, and for this reason alone the Permian ocean and its fate have been far more studied than the Devonian. But there is another reason to concentrate on the Permian mass extinction: it took place on a world with a climate more similar to that of today than anytime in the Devonian. Even more important, it was a world with ice sheets at the poles, something the more tropical Devonian Period may never have witnessed. For much of the Permian Period, the Earth, as it does today, had abundant ice caps at both poles, and there were large-scale continental glaciations up until at least 270 million years ago, and perhaps even later.4 But from then until the end of the Permian, the planet rapidly warmed, the ice caps disappeared, and the deep ocean bottoms filled with great volumes of warm, virtually oxygen-free seawater. The trigger for disaster was a short-term but massive **infusion of carbon dioxide** and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere at the end of the Permian from the spectacular lava outpourings over an appreciable portion of what would become northern Asia. The lava, now ancient but still in place, is called the “Siberian Traps,” the latter term coming from the Scandinavian for lava flows. The great volcanic event was but the start of things, and led to changes in oceanography. The ultimate kill mechanism seems to have been a lethal combination of rising temperature, diminishing oxygen, and influx into water and air of the highly poisonous compound hydrogen sulfide. The cruel irony is that this latter poison was itself produced by life, not by the volcanoes. The bottom line is that life produced the ultimate killer in this and surely other ancient mass extinctions. This finding was one that spurred me to propose the Medea Hypothesis, and a book of the same name.5 Hydrogen sulfide poisoning might indeed be the worst biological effect of global warming. There is no reason that such an event cannot happen again, given short-term global warming. And because of the way the sun ages, it may be that such events will be ever easier to start than during the deep past. How does the sun get involved in such nasty business as mass extinction? Unlike a campfire that burns down to embers, any star gets ever hotter when it is on the “main sequence,” which is simply a term used to described the normal aging of a star—something like the progression we all go through as we age. But new work by Jeff Kiehl of the University of Colorado shows that because the sun keeps getting brighter, amounts of CO2 that in the past would not have triggered the process result in stagnant oceans filled with H2S-producing microbes. His novel approach was to estimate the global temperature rise to be expected from carbon dioxide levels added to the energy hitting the earth from the sun. Too often we refer to the greenhouse effect as simply a product of the gases. But it is sunlight that actually produces the heat, and that amount of energy hitting the earth keeps increasing. He then compared those to past times of mass extinctions. The surprise is that a CO2 level of 1,000 ppm would—with our current solar radiation—make our world the second hottest in Earth history—when the five hottest were each associated with mass extinction. In the deep history of our planet, there have been at least five short intervals in which the majority of living species suddenly went extinct. Biologists are used to thinking about how environmental pressures slowly choose the organisms most fit for survival through natural selection, shaping life on Earth like an artist sculpting clay. However, mass extinctions are drastic examples of natural selection at its most ruthless, killing vast numbers of species at one time in a way hardly typical of evolution. In the 1980s, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis Alvarez, and his son Walter Alvarez, first hypothesized that the impact of comets or asteroids caused the mass extinctions of the past.6 Most scientists slowly come to accept this theory of extinction, further supported by the discovery of a great scar in the earth—an impact crater—off the coast of Mexico that dates to around the time the dinosaurs went extinct. An asteroid probably did kill off the dinosaurs, but the causes of the remaining four mass extinctions are still obscured beneath the accumulated effects of hundreds of millions of years, and no one has found any credible evidence of impact craters. Rather than comets and asteroids, it now appears that short-term global warming was the culprit for the four other mass extinctions. I detailed the workings of these extinctions first in a 1996 Discover magazine article,7 then in an October 2006 Scientific American article, and finally in my 2007 book, Under a Green Sky.8 In each I considered whether such events could happen again. In my mind, such extinctions constitute the worst that could happen to life and the earth as a result of short-term global warming. But before we get to that, let us look at the workings of these past events. The evidence at hand links the mass extinctions with a changeover in the ocean from oxygenated to anoxic bottom waters. The source of this was a change in where bottom waters are formed. It appears that in such events, the source of our earth’s deep water shifted from the high latitudes to lower latitudes, and the kind of water making it to the ocean bottoms was different as well: it changed from cold, oxygenated water to warm water containing less oxygen. The result was the extinction of deep-water organisms. Thus a greenhouse extinction is a product of a changeover of the conveyor-belt current systems found on Earth any time there is a marked difference in temperatures between the tropics and the polar regions. Let us summarize the steps that make greenhouse extinction happen. First, the world warms over short intervals due to a sudden increase in carbon dioxide and methane, caused initially by the formation of vast volcanic provinces called flood basalts. The warmer world affects the ocean circulation systems and disrupts the position of the conveyor currents. Bottom waters begin to have warm, low-oxygen water dumped into them. The warming continues, and the decrease of equator-to-pole temperature differences brings ocean winds and surface currents to a near standstill. The mixing of oxygenated surface waters with the deeper and volumetrically increasing low-oxygen bottom waters lessens, causing ever-shallower water to change from oxygenated to anoxic. Finally, the bottom water exists in depths where light can penetrate, and the combination of low oxygen and light allows green sulfur bacteria to expand in numbers, filling the low-oxygen shallows. The bacteria produce toxic amounts of H2S, with the flux of this gas into the atmosphere occurring at as much as 2,000 times today’s rates. The gas rises into the high atmosphere, where it breaks down the ozone layer. The subsequent increase in ultraviolet radiation from the sun kills much of the photosynthetic green plant phytoplankton. On its way up into the sky, the hydrogen sulfide also kills some plant and animal life, and the combination of high heat and hydrogen sulfide creates a mass extinction on land.9 Could this happen again? No, says one of the experts who write the RealClimate.org Web site, Gavin Schmidt, who, it turns out, works under Jim Hansen at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center near Washington, DC. I disagreed and challenged him to an online debate. He refused, saying that the environmental situation is going to be bad enough without resorting to creating a scenario for mass extinction. But special pleading has no place in science. Could it be that **global warming could lead to the extinction of humanity**? That prospect cannot be discounted. To pursue this question, let us look at what might be the most crucial of all systems maintaining habitability on Planet Earth: the thermohaline current systems, sometimes called the conveyor currents.

**Contention Three – Solvency**

**Lifting the embargo leads to increased sugar-based ethanol exports to the United States**

Joe **Conason**, journalist, author and political commentator, 7-18-200**8** (“One more good reason to lift the embargo on Cuba”, Salon.com, <http://www.salon.com/2008/07/18/cuba_6/>) JN

Now there is at least one more incentive to change course. **With its huge potential for producing clean, renewable, sugar-based ethanol, Cuba represents a significant source of energy that will remain unavailable to American consumers unless we undo the embargo**. Agricultural **experts** have **estimate**d that **Cuba could eventually provide more than 3 billion gallons of fuel annually, perhaps** even **more when new technologies for extracting energy from sugar cane waste** (known as “bagasse”) **come online** — placing the island third in world ethanol production, behind the U.S. and Brazil. **Given the** relatively **small demand for auto fuel in Cuba**, **nearly all of that ethanol would be available for export to its nearest neighbor.¶** Today **the Cuban government manufactures only nominal amounts of ethanol, mainly because of government policies favor**ing **table sugar and rum instead**. Fidel Castro reportedly feels that using cane for fuel instead of food is a capitalist crime against the poor. Having ceded power to his brother Raúl, however, the aging ruler may no longer control economic policy — and Raúl is widely viewed as the more flexible and pragmatic Castro. **A revitalized ethanol industry in Cuba would have an enormous ready market only 90 miles away. It is also worth noting that sugar ethanol not only seems to burn cleaner than the kind made from grain but could also reduce pressure on food prices**. (Besides, everyone would be better off eating less sugar.)¶ Like offshore oil, Cuban ethanol would not be available overnight. Sugar production has dropped precipitously under Castro and Cuba lacks substantial biorefinery capacity. Whether that capacity can be constructed faster than Exxon can find oil and build platforms is an open question. But the difference is that **Cuba could certainly grow far more sugar cane than it does currently**. And **once the oil is gone, there will be no more, while cane can grow year after year indefinitely** — without contributing to climate change or polluting the oceans.¶ Aside from pandering to the exile community in Miami, the sole argument against doing business with Cuba is the repressive nature of that regime, with its muzzled media, political prisoners and one-party state. But the same or worse can be said of Saudi Arabia, a country whose dismal human rights record we routinely ignore because we need its oil. Yoked by sharia law and the tender House of Saud, the Saudi people arguably suffer worse indignities than the poor Cubans. Neither can be called a free country, yet we arm and protect Riyadh while we harass and denounce Havana.¶ **The silly hypocrisy of our Cuba policy** — especially **contrasted to our close commercial and financial ties with Saudi Arabia, China and similarly execrable governments** — **has been obvious** for many, many years. **We have done the Cubans and ourselves no favors by refusing to engage their government**, as nearly every other country in other country in the world already does.

**Cuba would accept FDI for ethanol – Raul is for biofuels**

**Posner ‘8**

Andrew Posner – In 2007, Andy was an Environmental Studies Masters student at Brown University. He has gone on to be the Transportation correspondent for Treehugger.com – “Cuba: Can 'Red' Ethanol Be Green?” – Treehugger.com – February 25, 2008 – http://www.treehugger.com/cars/cuba-can-red-ethanol-be-green.html

After 49 years in power, **Fidel** Castro **has stepped aside and allowed** his brother **Raúl,** 76, **to be**come **president**. While hopes that "a younger generation might take power" have been washed away, many still expect to see changes with the "pragmatic military officer" in charge. **One change**s **may come in the form of an ethanol boom in Cuba**, where experts believe as much as 2 billions gallon could one day be produced annually, which would place Cuba third in worldwide production. According to Wired.com,¶ Fidel Castro hated ethanol. He thought it punished the poor by driving up food prices. But Cuba produces a lot of sugar, and **with** Fidel's brother **Raul - a fan of biofuels** - **expected to call the shots, Cuba could become a key player in the global ethanol game.**¶ Of course, **Cuba wouldn't be able to start producing all that ethanol without "a huge investment in Cuba's rickety sugar industry." And doing so will require** the kind of **reform** that has helped make China the powerhouse that it is: **namely, foreign investment. This kind of reform may not be as unlikely as it sounds.** According to a Washington Post article entitled 'End of Castro's Rule Opens Door for Reforms,' "**Cuba's leaders likely will "want to pursue an incremental, gradual approach to reform**" that does not privatize the large state-run sector but allows a new private sector to grow alongside it." Oh, and by the way, **Cuba has been modernizing its ethanol infrastructure, albeit quietly**.

# Ethanol 2AC

**Case Oil Dependence**

**Empirical, unbiased studies prove US hegemony prevents conflict—violence will only occur in a world without a leading power to ensure cooperation**

**Owen 11** (John Owen, associate professor of politics – University of Virginia, 2/11/11; “Don’t Discount Hegemony,” <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/>)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about *mutually* assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in *international* war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in *civil* wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

**Cap K**

**Capitalism is progressive, self-correcting, and wealth-generating – ensures sustainability**

**Goklany 7** -Julia Simon Fellow @ the Political Economy Research Center [Indur, Reason.com, “Now for the Good News,” 3/23/2007, <http://reason.com/archives/2007/03/23/now-for-the-good-news>]

Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression.

**Alternatives to Capitalism end in war and genocide**

**Rummel 4** – prof. emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii [Rudolph, The Killing Machine that is Marxism, Online]

Of all religions, secular and otherwise, that of Marxism has been by far the bloodiest – bloodier than the Catholic Inquisition, the various Catholic crusades, and the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants. In practice, Marxism has meant bloody terrorism, deadly purges, lethal prison camps and murderous forced labor, fatal deportations, man-made famines, extrajudicial executions and fraudulent show trials, outright mass murder and genocide. In total, Marxist regimes murdered nearly 110 million people from 1917 to 1987. For perspective on this incredible toll, note that all domestic and foreign wars during the 20th century killed around 35 million. That is, when Marxists control states, Marxism is more deadly then all the wars of the 20th century, including World Wars I and II, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars. And what did Marxism, this greatest of human social experiments, achieve for its poor citizens, at this most bloody cost in lives? Nothing positive. It left in its wake an economic, environmental, social and cultural disaster. The Khmer Rouge – (Cambodian communists) who ruled Cambodia for four years – provide insight into why Marxists believed it necessary and moral to massacre so many of their fellow humans. Their Marxism was married to absolute power. They believed without a shred of doubt that they knew the truth, that they would bring about the greatest human welfare and happiness, and that to realize this utopia, they had to mercilessly tear down the old feudal or capitalist order and Buddhist culture, and then totally rebuild a communist society. Nothing could be allowed to stand in the way of this achievement. Government – the Communist Party – was above any law. All other institutions, religions, cultural norms, traditions and sentiments were expendable. The Marxists saw the construction of this utopia as a war on poverty, exploitation, imperialism and inequality – and, as in a real war, noncombatants would unfortunately get caught in the battle. There would be necessary enemy casualties: the clergy, bourgeoisie, capitalists, "wreckers," intellectuals, counterrevolutionaries, rightists, tyrants, the rich and landlords. As in a war, millions might die, but these deaths would be justified by the end, as in the defeat of Hitler in World War II. To the ruling Marxists, the goal of a communist utopia was enough to justify all the deaths. The irony is that in practice, even after decades of total control, Marxism did not improve the lot of the average person, but usually made living conditions worse than before the revolution. It is not by chance that the world's greatest famines have happened within the Soviet Union (about 5 million dead from 1921-23 and 7 million from 1932-3, including 2 million outside Ukraine) and communist China (about 30 million dead from 1959-61). Overall, in the last century almost 55 million people died in various Marxist famines and associated epidemics – a little over 10 million of them were intentionally starved to death, and the rest died as an unintended result of Marxist collectivization and agricultural policies. What is astonishing is that this "currency" of death by Marxism is not thousands or even hundreds of thousands, but millions of deaths. This is almost incomprehensible – it is as though the whole population of the American New England and Middle Atlantic States, or California and Texas, had been wiped out. And that around 35 million people escaped Marxist countries as refugees was an unequaled vote against Marxist utopian pretensions.

**Cap solves war**

**Bandow 5** - Former assistant to president Regan, Senior fellow @ the Cato institute (Doug, “Spreading Capitalism is good for Peace,” 11/10/05, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5193/)

But Gartzke argues that "the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states. Thus, while "democracy is desirable for many reasons," he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom in the World, created by the Fraser Institute, "representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." Capitalism is by far the more important factor. The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends.

**Cap solves inequality**

**Bartholomew, 06** - Author of 'The Welfare State we’re In' he is also a writer and columnist for the Daily Telegraph (James Bartholomew, “We need a revision course on why capitalism is a good thing” May 24th, 2006, Lexis-Nexis Academic)

Capitalism has made us richer and given us the opportunity of vastly more diverse experiences. Even in my own lifetime, I have seen the normal length of holidays rise from one or two weeks to four or five weeks. Foreign travel that was unknown for most working people two centuries ago is now commonplace. Did government direction make this possible? Of course not. Most families now have cars. Read Thomas Hardy's novels and you find that people are always walking. Walking can be healthy and pleasant, but the average family of Hardy's time did not have a choice. Who invented cars? Who refined their design and manufacture to the point where they are affordable by millions of people? Not governments. The diverse, resourceful, determined power of capitalism. Why does the system work? Because it provides incentives and motivation. If you invent something, you may get fame and fortune. If you supply food or cars cheaper, you get more customers. Simple enough. Provide a good product or service at a low price and you have a business. That simple logic means capitalism tends to produce good products and services at better prices. What about the argument that capitalism promotes inequality? Let's remember, before even starting to answer, just how disastrous were the attempts in the 20th century to impose equality. Farmers in Leninist Russia were prosecuted and in many cases killed. Tens of millions died under communist rule in China. And after all the oppression and suffering, there was still no equality. There was the privileged ruling class with, in Russia's case, special dachas in the country and road lanes in town. Imposing equality is not an easy ride. It is oppressive and doomed to failure. Capitalism, meanwhile, has claims, at the least, to reducing inequality over time. The inequality was enormous when George III was sitting on his gilded throne in 1806, with thousands of servants and farm workers and other underlings at his beck and call, while elsewhere in the country were those who could barely find enough to eat and, in some cases, died of hunger. Nowadays, more than nine out of 10 young people have mobile phones, 99 per cent of households have colour televisions, most households have cars. Yes, the rich are still with us. But the contrast in financial wealth has been greatly reduced over the long term. That was not due to any government, let alone a deliberate attempt to promote equality. It was achieved by capitalism. Why is the system now taken for granted and despised? Perhaps it is because the collapse of the communist states has removed from our sight useful reminders of how vastly superior capitalism is to state control. We should be careful.

**Capitalism is key to the formation of successful space programs**

**Martin 10** (Robert, Amerika, June 21, <http://www.amerika.org/politics/centrifuge-capitalism/>, accessed: 3 July 2011)

Centralization and capitalism are necessary for any intelligent civilization, yet in excess drains the base population of any sustenance whatsoever, leaving them unemployed, homeless and starving at worst. The answer to this event is not a swing on the pendulum all the way onto total equality fisted socialism out on a plate for everyone who isn’t rich, that would be devastating for organization, but is a more natural ecosystem type of financing of a near-barter economics with different values and currencies for localized entities and more buoyant monetary for inter-localities – only monetizing where absolutely necessary. Without the higher economics that goes beyond small barter communities, there could be no space programs, or planetary defences providing the technology or the organization necessary to survive extinction events or fund a military etc, it’s critical for the structure of the superorganism – yet too much and some individuals inside of it become so padded from outside reality that they completely ignore the world around them.

**Extinction - we have to go to space**

**Garan, 10** – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” <http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-to-the-moon>)

Resources and Other Benefits: Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet. Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration. The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

**CIR**

**Immigration won’t pass – fiscal battles thump, 2014 means no bill – election year**

**Sherman & Brown, 8/28** – (Jake & Carrie Burdoff, “Immigration reform’s No. 1 enemy: Time,” POLITICO, 28 August 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/immigration-reform-95980.html)//BI

**Immigration reform advocates have a new enemy: the congressional calendar**. Fall’s **fiscal fights** have lined up in a way that **could delay immigration reform until 2014**, multiple senior House Republican leadership aides tell POLITICO, **imperiling the effort’s prospects before the midterm elections**. **The mid-October debt ceiling deadline** — an earlier-than-expected target laid out Monday by Treasury Secretary Jack Lew — **is changing the House GOP leadership’s plans to pass immigration** bills that month. “If we have to deal with the debt limit earlier, it doesn’t change the overall dynamics of the debate, but — just in terms of timing — it might make it harder to find time for immigration bills in October,” one House Republican leadership aide said. That’s not the only scheduling challenge. **There are fewer than 40 congressional working days until the end of 2013** — the unofficial deadline for passing immigration reform — **and they’ll present some of the most politically challenging votes** for lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. It will be difficult to add immigration reform to the list, senior aides say. **Government funding runs dry on Sept. 30**. The nine days **the House** is in session that month **will be crowded with the debate over** the **continuing resolution** to keep the government operating. The GOP leadership will have to reconcile the screams from conservatives who want to use the bill to defund Obamacare with their own desire to avoid a government shutdown. Of course, **anything the House approves would need to pass the** Democratic-controlled **Senate, which will ignore attempts to weaken the law.** Immigration reform isn’t certain to die if it slips into 2014, some in GOP leadership say. But **major progress must be made in 2013 as it would be too difficult for the House to chart a course in 2014, an election year**. At a fundraiser in Idaho on Monday, Speaker John **Boehner predicted a “whale of a fight” over the debt ceiling**. That skirmish will surface in October. The House is in session for 14 days during that month, but there is certain to be a good deal of debate over passing a bill that would extend the nation’s borrowing authority. GOP leadership is mulling its initial negotiating position, which is sure to include some changes to entitlements, energy policy and the health care law. Boehner’s leadership team also seems open to discussing ways to soften **the blow of the sequester in October**, which **would add yet another explosive issue to the mix**. **The White House refuses to negotiate with Republicans over the debt limit**, leaving little clarity on how the standoff gets resolved — and when. “Congress has already authorized funding, committed us to make expenditures,” Lew told CNBC Tuesday. “We’re now in the place where the only question is will we pay the bills that the United States has incurred. The only way to do that is for Congress to act — for it to act quickly.” A senior administration official said Tuesday that **the increasingly crowded fall calendar was why Obama pressed the House to deal with immigration before the August recess**. But the Republican leaders need to make time for it, the official said, and they should want to do it sooner rather than later because the pressure from the president and others isn’t going to let up. But the **scarce legislative days and** the **fiscal battles will be welcome to** some **House Republicans squeamish about voting on immigration** reform. There is little support for passing the kind of comprehensive bill approved by the Senate. But **even the piecemeal approach** being pushed by the House leadership **has its fair share of skeptics** in the GOP conference.

**Both sides want to end the sugar embargo – key to energy independence and common ground outweighs opposition**

**Escandon, ‘08** (Jennifer Gerz Escandon -– Ph.D. International Relation at University of Miami, National Scholarship and Fellowship Coordinator for Georgetown University Honors College, Director of International Studies at University of Evansville**,** “End the US-Cuba embargo: It’s a win-win,” CS Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1009/p09s02-coop.html>, October 9, 2008)

**Even as Cubans recover from hurricanes** Gustav and Ike, **their desire to end the embargo remains strong**. In rejecting a modest initial offer of US aid on Sept. 4, Cuban President Raul Castro called instead for the whole enchilada of normalized economic relations. **The United States is** equally resolute **in** its nearly 50-year-old **opposition to the socialist dictatorship**. As simply put by the CATO Institute, Washington's chief rationale for the embargo has been to "compel a democratic transformation" in Cuba.¶ **Yet common ground exists**. In broad terms, **both sides want national security and economic opportunity. Now is the time to pursue those shared interests**. Mutually beneficial opportunities in three areas - agricultural trade, **energy development**, and immigration - **could provide the foundation for a postembargo relationship**.¶ For years, US farmers have lobbied Congress - only somewhat successfully - to open Cuban markets, which are lucrative and feature low transportation costs. Both sides could realize benefits from greater liberalization: relaxed payment options for cash-strapped Cuba and the end of licenses and quotas for US farmers. Despite the embargo, the US is Cuba's largest supplier of food and its sixth-largest trading partner.¶ Secondly, **direct US engagement could allow** two of the nation's largest revenue generators, the **Cuban** nickel and **sugar** industries, **to expand** into more capital-intensive energy research through university and private-sector partnerships.¶ Most Cuban exports are currently destined for Canada, China, or the Netherlands as raw or lightly refined materials. Yet, with funding for technology and without the fear of embargo-based repercussions from the US, Cuban research opportunities and export products could have the potential to diversify.¶ By gaining the freedom and cooperative assistance to make this transition, Cuba could address its own energy dependence while leap-frogging years ahead on modernization. For starters, **Cuba could explore the sugar-bioenergy market** and the energy-related uses of nickel. Given the abundance of well-trained but under-employed Cuban engineers, the ingredients for a perfect storm of innovation are already present.¶ For its part, by ending the embargo, **the US** simultaneously **gains security through stability in Cuba. More important, by investing** in the future prototype for emerging markets - a 42,803-square-mile green energy and technology lab called Cuba - **America gains a dedicated partner in the search for energy independence**.

**Both Congress and Castro agree upon opening trade up to sugar**

Dale McFeatters – National Columnist, writes for Washington Times and Scripps Howard News Service, 4/12/09, Rethinking Cuba, Korea Times, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2013/05/160\_42996.html

**Congress** is considering lifting the ban on travel by Americans to Cuba, which it should because Americans should be free to travel where they like without being harassed by their own government.¶ The Obama administration **is moving toward lifting limits** on how often Cuban Americans can visit and how much money they can send family members on the island, which is good because those limits were simply spiteful.¶ And **there is growing support for easing the trade embargo on Cuba**, which only makes sense **because the embargo is** closing in on **50 years of proven failure**. It was counterproductive in that Fidel Castro regularly invoked it to excuse his economic mismanagement.¶ We already allow the sale of certain agricultural products to Cuba, and there's no reason farmers should be favored over other exporters.¶ If Cuba wants to send back cigars and rum and people think that consuming them would be supporting a dictatorship, don't drink the rum or smoke the cigars.¶ If we're going to persist in the delusion that ethanol is somehow going to be a workable substitute for gasoline, **we're going to need additional sources of ethanol and Cuba has plenty of sugar cane.**¶ A delegation from the Congressional Black Caucus visited Havana and reported back that **the Castro brothers, the only voices that really count in Cuba, are ready for better relations with the United States**.¶ According to the Associated Press, **Raul Castro, who became interim leader of Cuba after Fidel's surgery in 2006 and was formally named president last year, told the delegation that "everything was on the table" in reopening dialogue with the United States.**¶ Three of the members got a rare sit-down with Fidel. AP quoted Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., as saying **Castro "looked directly into our eyes" and asked, "How can we help President Obama?"**

**Presidential leadership’s irrelevant – ideology, institutional roadblocks, constituencies**

**Jacobs and King 10**

Lawrence Jacobs and Desmond King 10, University of Minnesota, Nuffield College, 8-2010 “Varieties of Obamaism: Structure, Agency, and the Obama Presidency,” Perspectives on Politics, 793-802

But personality is not a solid foundation for a persuasive explanation of presidential impact and the shortfalls or accomplishments of Obama's presidency. Modern presidents have brought divergent individual traits to their jobs and yet they have routinely failed to enact much of their agendas. Preeminent policy goals of Bill Clinton (health reform) and George W. Bush (Social Security privatization) met the same fate, though these presidents' personalities vary widely. And presidents like Jimmy Carter—whose personality traits have been criticized as ill-suited for effective leadership—enjoyed comparable or stronger success in Congress than presidents lauded for their personal knack for leadership—from Lyndon Johnson to Ronald Reagan.7 Indeed, a personalistic account provides little leverage for explaining the disparities in Obama's record—for example why he succeeded legislatively in restructuring health care and higher education, failed in other areas, and often accommodated stakeholders. Decades of rigorous research find that impersonal, structural forces offer the most compelling explanations for presidential impact.8 Quantitative research that compares legislative success and presidential personality finds no overall relationship.9 In his magisterial qualitative and historical study, Stephen Skowronek reveals that institutional dynamics and ideological commitments structure presidential choice and success in ways that **trump** the personal predilections of individual presidents.10 Findings point to the predominant influence on presidential legislative success of the ideological and partisan composition of Congress, entrenched interests, identities, and institutional design, and a constitutional order that invites multiple and competing lines of authority. The widespread presumption, then, that Obama's personal traits or leadership style account for the obstacles to his policy proposals is called into question by a generation of scholarship on the presidency. Indeed, the presumption is not simply problematic analytically, but practically as well. For the misdiagnosis of the source of presidential weakness may, paradoxically, induce failure by distracting the White House from strategies and tactics where presidents can make a difference. Following a meeting with Obama shortly after Brown's win, one Democratic senator lamented the White House's delusion that a presidential sales pitch will pass health reform—“Just declaring that he's still for it doesn't mean that it comes off life support.”11 Although Obama's re-engagement after the Brown victory did contribute to restarting reform, the senator's comment points to the importance of ideological and partisan coalitions in Congress, organizational combat, institutional roadblocks, and anticipated voter reactions. Presidential **sales pitches go only so far**.

**Winning controversial issues creates a bandwagon effect**

**Hirsh, 13**

Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com. (“There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital”, National Journal, 2/7/2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207)

But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

**Obama won’t push CIR**

**Sarlin 6/11**

[Benjy, syndicated political commentator, “Obama: Congress, Get Your Act Together on Immigration,” MSNBC, 6/11/13, <http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/06/11/president-obama-tells-congress-to-get-its-act-together-on-immigration/>]

For the most part, **Obama has been content to watch the debate from the sidelines in order to give Republicans political cover to negotiate a bill without tying themselves to the administration. The** **White House does have an immigration plan** of its own that shares the same general structure as the “Gang of Eight,” which officials say they intend to introduce as a bill **only if talks break down in Congress**.

**Extinction comes first**

**Bok, 88** (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kant’s moral theory.

# Ethanol 1AR

## Cap K

**Empirics first – discourse focus is epistemologically flawed and paralyzes action**

**Rodwell 5** (Jonathan, Ph.D. student at Manchester Metropolitan University, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm slim\_)

The reason it **there is no attempt to explore** the **complexity of causation** is that **this would clearly automatically undermine the concentration on discourse. Moreover it would require** the **admittance of identifiable evidence** about the real world to be able to say anything about it! For **if something historical changed the meaning of a word**, **or** if something about **society gave** the word a **different** meaning and **impact**, then **it would be** an **identifiable** ‘something’. Moreover if the word is tied to and altered by an historical event or social impact, would it not be a case of assessing the effect of original event itself as well as the language? The larger problem is that **without clear causal links between materially identifiable events** and factors any **assessment** within the argument actually **becomes nonsensical**. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no traditional causational discussion how can we know what is happening? For example, **Jackson details how** the **rhetoric of anti-terrorism** and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world killers are not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is **how do we know this**? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much – Jackson himself quoting to Dr David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. **The** only **problem** of course **is that discourse analysis has established** (as argued by Jackson) **that** King’s **argument would just be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own reasons**. Ultimately it would be no more valid than the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I don’t personally believe global terrorism is the world’s primary threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But **without the ability to identify real facts** about the world **we can simply say anything, or** we can say **nothing**. This is clearly ridiculous and many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there “are empirically more persuasive explanations.”[xi] The phrase ‘**empirically persuasive’** is however the final undermining of post-structural discourse analysis. It **is a** seemingly fairly **obvious reintroduction of traditional methodology and causal links**. It implies **things** that **can be seen to be right regardless of perspective or discourse**. It again goes without saying that logically in this case if such an assessment is possible then undeniable material factors about the word are real and are knowable outside of any cultural definition. **Language** or culture then **does not wholy constitute reality**. How do **we know** in the end that **the world** **not threatened by** the onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous breakfast **cereal**? **Because empirically persuasive evidence tells us** this is the case. **The question** must **then** be asked, **is our understanding of the world born of evidential assessment**, **or** born of **discourse analysis**? Or perhaps it’s actually born of utilisation of many different possible explanations.

**Ethics are inherently situational – we are forced to make hard choices because we have finite resources and political capabilities. Ethics makes us push the blame onto others to maintain the purity of our intentions instead of taking responsibility**

**Chandler, 1** – Policy Research Institute at Leeds Metropolitan University (David, Human Rights Quarterly 23, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism”)

When intervening for ethical ends there is little pressure to account for final policy outcomes. Whatever happens in the targeted states, under international sanctions or military action, it can be alleged to be better than non-intervention. As both Tony Blair and The Guardian argued in response to the ‘collateral’ deaths of ethnic Albanian refugees from the high altitude Nato bombing campaign in Kosovo: ‘Milosevic is determined to wipe a people from the face of this country. Nato is determined to stop him’(The Guardian, 15 May 1999). The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, although dismissing the idea that there was a Serb policy of genocide, still concluded that ‘The issue in Kosovo was ... whether in the absence of Nato intervention, the Serb campaign would have continued over many years, eventually resulting in more deaths and instability in the region than if Nato had not intervened. We believe that it would’ (UKFAC 2000, para.123). The belief that it would have been even worse without international action provides a hypothetical post facto justification that is difficult to disprove. The discourse of ethical foreign policy establishes a framework of western intervention which inevitably encourages a positive view of intervention in the face of exaggerated fears of non-intervention.

**The impact is genocide**

**Mohawk, 2000**, Associate Professor of History at SUNY Buffalo (John C, Utopian Legacies, p. 4-5, 2000)

People who believe that they are acting on a plan to solve all of the humankind’s problems think they are on a kind of sacred mission, even when the origin of their inspiration is secular in nature and makes no claim to intervention by a higher power. Although adherents may have only a vague idea about how the utopia will come about or what it will be like when it arrives, utopian movements often stimulate high levels of enthusiasm and a widely shared sense of being a “chosen people” with a special destiny. People caught up in such movements tend to be intolerant of others who are not part of this projected destiny, who do not believe in the same things, and are not expected to share in the future benefits. One reason for the popularity of these movements is that they exalt the importance of the group, praise their imagined superior qualities and future prospects, and urge that, relative to other peoples, they are special and more deserving. This pattern of self-aggrandizement has often proven popular and energizing. It contains a message that others who are not special or chosen are without significant value and may be treated accordingly. This kind of intolerance can result in the denial of rights, including the right to live, to hold property, to vote, or to hold professional licenses, if the inspired group has the power to do these things. A scornful indifference to these unbelieving and unentitled others can manifest as racism and/or ethnocentrism. Such intolerance has been known to lead to crimes against humanity, including systematic acts of genocide.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)